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CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT RULES:  THE DENOMINATOR PROBLEM 
Rosalind Dixon & Richard Holden 
Formal procedures for constitutional amendment play a number of important functions in a 
constitutional democracy.  In cases of major constitutional change, they help ensure that change 
occurs via legal, rather than extra-legal, means (Griffin).  In other cases, they provide legislatures 
with the means to alter or “update” specific constitutional rules, or to engage in “dialogue” with 
courts about the interpretation of more open-ended constitutional provisions (see Dixon 2010a; 
and compare also Denning & Vile; Forbath).    
Over time, there may also be increasing demand for constitutional amendment procedures 
to play both this kind of rule-updating and dialogic function.  Changing social circumstances and 
understandings will often make specific constitutional rules outmoded, yet in most countries, 
courts do not respond to this by changing their interpretation of such rules (Dixon 2010a). Courts 
also tend over time to engage in more interpretation in aggregate (Samaha) in a way that invites 
greater scope for legislative disagreement – or dialogue.  As an empirical matter, there is 
certainly evidence that older constitutions tend to be amended more frequently than newer ones 
(see Lutz 1995, p.253; Ferejohn 1997, p. 524; Elkins, Ginsburg, and Melton 2009). 
At the same time, as constitutions age, they may also become more difficult to amend.  
One reason for is that in most jurisdictions the population tends to increase over time in a way 
directly raises the costs of, or hurdles to, successful constitutional amendment.1 
A number of authors have suggested the possibility of this kind of a “denominator 
problem” in the context of constitutional amendment rules (see Buchanan & Tulloch, Samaha).   
James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, for example, have argued that “[e]veryday experience in 
the work of committees of varying size confirms… [the] direct functional relationship between 
the individual [bargaining or decision] costs of collective decision-making and the size of the 
group required to reach agreement” (Buchanan and Tullock [1962] 2004, p. 55).  Because there 
is greater uncertainty in larger decision-making bodies about what others will do, and therefore 
the benefits of cooperation, they have also posited a direct a relationship between the size of a 
collective decision-making body and holdout costs, or the “opportunity cost of bargains that are 
never made” (Buchanan and Tullock [1962] 2004, pp. 65-66).  In other work, we have also 
suggested that successful constitutional amendment may be more difficult in larger decision-
making bodies, simply as a result of the law of large numbers (Holden, 2009; Dixon 2010a, 
Dixon 2011).    
In this chapter, we provide the first empirical test to date of these hypotheses, by 
gathering and analyzing a unique year-by-year dataset on constitutional amendment rates at a 
state constitutional level in the U.S.  Using this dataset, we show a clear, statistically significant 
negative relationship between the size of legislative voting bodies and the rate of constitutional 
amendment in various states, under various specifications.  We further suggest that this finding 
has potentially important – yet hitherto overlooked– implications for the design of constitutional 
amendment rules.  
                                                      
1 See United Nations 2007, p. vii.  Another reason is that constitutions may become more venerated over time, in 
ways that increase the political costs of proposing amendments: see e.g. Griffin. 
The chapter is divided into four parts.  Part I briefly sets out the existing theoretical 
arguments about the relationship between the size of constitutional decision-making bodies and 
the costs, or hurdles, to constitutional amendment.    Part II sets out the basic empirical findings 
of the paper.   Part III discusses possible implications for constitutional design, including the role 
mechanisms such as: (i) sliding-scale constitutional amendment rules; (ii) a low, as compared to 
high, constitutional super-majority rules; and (iii) constitutional convention could play in 
addressing the denominator problem identified, and the potential disadvantages, as well as 
advantages, of each mechanism.  Part IV offers a brief conclusion.   
I. CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT, DIFFICULTY & SCALE: THEORETICAL 
ARGUMENTS 
The size of a particular voting body will have the potential to influence the effective difficulty of 
constitutional amendment for two inter-related reasons: one having to do with the decision costs 
associated with the process of constitutional amendment; and another with the statistical 
likelihood that (at least quasi-) independent decision-makers will ultimately favor a particular 
proposed amendment. 
In most constitutional settings, there will be some practical limit on the number of 
constitutional amendments that will be feasible for a legislature, or population as a whole, to 
adopt.  The higher the decision costs are, for any given successful constitutional amendment, the 
fewer the amendments there will therefore be, overall.   According to almost all theories of 
constitutional decision-making, the decision-costs associated with a successful process of 
constitutional amendment will also have a clear capacity to increase, along with the size of the 
relevant constitutional voting body. 
For many constitutional theorists, a key function of constitutional amendment rules is to 
ensure that adequate deliberation occurs about the potential advantages and disadvantages of any 
proposed constitutional change, before such change occurs (see e.g. Ackerman 1991; Michelman 
1986).  In most countries, this means that the process of constitutional amendment requires some 
degree of legislative, not just popular, involvement.  Where this is the case, the time– and 
therefore also opportunity cost –of debating proposed constitutional amendments will have a 
clear relationship with the size of the relevant voting body.  The more members there are in a 
given decision-making body, the more time it will take to hear from each member.  Because 
deliberation involves an exchange of ideas, adding new members to a legislative body will also 
increase the time taken for existing members to absorb and respond to the arguments of new 
members, and also to debate with one another, about those new arguments.   As the size of the 
legislature increases, deliberation-based decision costs (“deliberation costs”) therefore have the 
potential not only to increase but also to do so exponentially. 
For other constitutional theorists, constitutional amendment rules embody a more 
outcome-oriented trade-off from the perspective of individual citizens, between, on the one hand, 
the danger of “external costs”, and on the other, the likely magnitude of “bargaining”– and also 
“hold out” – costs (see e.g. Buchanan and Tullock [1962] 2004).  External costs are those that 
individuals must bear as “a result of the actions of others over which he [or she] has no direct 
control,” or in a constitutional context, the costs to an individual of constitutional changes that he 
or she does not favor (Buchanan and Tullock [1962] 2004, p. 43).  Bargaining costs are the costs 
individuals must occur in seeking to bargain, or negotiate, collective agreement in favor of a 
proposed constitutional amendment they favor; and holdout costs the “opportunity cost of 
bargains that are never made” (Buchanan and Tullock [1962] 2004, pp. 65-66).  According to 
scholars such as James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock [1962] 2004, both forms of decision cost 
may also increase significantly with the size of a collective decision-making body.  “Everyday 
experience in the work of committees of varying size confirms”, Buchanan and Tullock ([1962] 
2004) suggest, the “direct functional relationship between the individual [bargaining] costs of 
collective decision-making and the size of the group required to reach agreement” (Buchanan 
and Tullock [1962] 2004, p. 55).  Holdout costs will also tend to increase, along with the size of 
a collective decision-making body, because greater uncertainty about what others will do, and 
therefore the benefits of cooperation, may make individuals “more reluctant to grant 
concessions” (Buchanan and Tullock [1962] 2004, p. 55).   
Decision costs aside, we have argued that successful constitutional amendment may also 
be more difficult in larger polities, simply as a result of the law of large numbers (Holden 2009, 
Dixon, 2010a, Dixon 2011).  The reason for this is that, in larger voting bodies, there will tend to 
be less idiosyncratic variation in the distribution of voter preferences, relative to the underlying 
views of the median voter, and therefore less likelihood of there being a super-majority position 
in favor of a change to the status quo. 
Assume, for example, that the median voter in a given polity is more or less indifferent 
when it comes to whether or not to amend the constitution; that the views of the median voter on 
this question do not tend to change radically with the scale of the polity; and that the views of a 
particular representative voting body – such as the legislature or a sub-section of voters who 
choose to vote at a particular election – are drawn at least semi-randomly from the voting 
population as a whole.  Under a super-majority voting rule, the law of large numbers means that, 
even absent any change in decision costs, in a large decision-making body it is far less likely 
than in a smaller body that there will be an idiosyncratic draw of preferences or types in favor of 
amendment.  
Consider the probability, shown in figure 1, of obtaining a majority vote in favor of 
ratifying a constitutional amendment, by way of a coin toss – “heads” being a vote in favor of 
changing the status quo, and “tails” being a vote for the status quo.   For a voting body with (say) 
3 or 6 members, the probability of successful amendment is 50% or 34%; respectively whereas 
for a voting body of even 12 or 24 the probability is as low as 19% or 8%.    For a voting body 
with a 100 members, the probability of successful amendment falls below 1%. 
 
 
Figure 1 –Scale & probability of amendment given Super-majority Rule 
 
As one of us has shown elsewhere, this effect is also quite general, and does not depend 
on the binary nature of outcomes in the “coin flip” setting (see Holden 2009).  Rather, it applies 
even where there is a continuum of voter preferences and policy choices.  The only limitation on 
this effect is that it is likely to apply most strongly at the lower, rather higher, ranges of 
population size – i.e. where the law of large numbers is yet to apply. 
In a legislative setting, both decision costs and the law of large numbers suggest that, 
after controlling for other factors, such as the relevant constitutional amendment rule, there 
should be quite clear negative relationship between the size of a legislative voting body and the 
effective rate of constitutional amendment (hypothesis 1).    
In a popular setting, by contrast, it seems much less likely that there will be a statistically 
significant relationship between the scale of a polity and the rate of amendment, considering that, 
in such a setting, there is both limited opportunity for deliberation and bargaining, and 
sufficiently large population from the outset, that a principle of diminishing returns (to the law of 
large numbers) is likely to apply.   However, to the extent that there is any relationship found 
between the size of the overall population and the effective rate of constitutional amendment, in 
states with a popular ratification requirement (i.e. all states other than Delaware), both theories 
would also predict that the relationship should be negative, rather than positive (hypothesis 2). 
II. THE DATA ON AMENDMENT RATES & DENOMINATORS  
In order to test the two relevant hypotheses empirically, we collected data for 41 states on state 
population size, legislative size, the formal requirements for constitutional amendment and the 
annual amendment rate, for each state constitution, from the time of adoption of the present 
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constitution to the present.2  This generated 4372 observations.  For each constitution in our 
dataset, we also obtained data on the length of the relevant constitution, its life-span or number 
of years in existence, and its co-existence with other constitutional restrictions such as a single-
subject rule and a double passage requirement. 
The key advantage of obtaining year-by-year data of this kind, rather than simply 
aggregate data such as that used by Donald Lutz (1995) in his pioneering earlier work in this 
area, is that it allowed us to test state-level types of constitutional heterogeneity.3  Since there 
have been several changes to amendment rules within various states, over time, the use of all 
state constitutions, both past and present, also provided us with useful additional variation in 
testing hypotheses 2-4 in particular.   As John Ferejohn (1997) has shown in a closely related 
context, using all the available variation in the data has significant advantages in this context, 
and can even lead to different conclusions.  Table 1 presents summary statistics of these 
variables. 
[insert table 1] 
VAP is the voting-age population in a given year, and VAPSQUARED is the square of 
this.  INITIATIVE is a dummy variable measuring the possibility of popular initiatives, which 
takes the value 0 if initiatives are not possible, 1 if the requirement is less than 10% of the voting 
population (usually measured as the percentage of those who voted in the last gubernatorial 
election), and 2 if 10% or more such signatures are required.  DOUBLEPASS is a dummy 
variable which takes the value 1 if amendments must pass the legislature in two successive 
sessions; and 0 otherwise.  LEGBUCK_n is a dummy variable which measures the voting rule 
for passage in the legislature: it takes value 1 (i.e. LEGBUCK1) if the rule is 50%, 2 if it is 60%, 
3 if there is a 2/3 requirement, and 4 if there is a ¾ requirement.4  EXPOSURE is the number of 
years which the current constitution has been in place.  LENGTH is the length of the constitution 
in words.5  SINGSUB is a dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the constitution has a 
single subject rule for constitutional amendment. 
                                                      
2 These data were collected from the text of the state constitutions, the National Bureau of Economic Research 
(“NBER”) state constitutions project, the US Census Bureau, and numerous copies of The Book of the States, The 
Council of State Governments, Lexington, KY.   The states for which data was not available were: Alabama, 
Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Maryland, Minnesota, Missouri, Tennessee, and Wyoming.  For these states, data was 
available on amendment rates, but not on the size of the state legislature for relevant time-periods.  
3 On the more general advantages of longitudinal count data such as those assembled here, see e.g. Neyman 1965; 
Hausman, Hall and Griliches 1984 (in the context of patents/research and development).  For an excellent overview 
and extension to more general stochastic processes see King, 1989. As Hausman, Hall and Griliches (1984) pointed 
out in their pioneering work, there are certain additional complications involved the analysis of panel count data.  
The two main issues are how to allow for persistent state effects (ie. fixed or random effects), and how to allow for 
disturbances-in-the-equation for a discrete probability distribution.  The negative binomial specifications we use 
address these issues. 
4 For all 50 states the current voting rule is the same in the upper and lower houses of the state legislature, and hence 
we do not separate upper and lower house voting rules. 
5 We do not have this data available on a year-by-year basis, and thus use the current length for all years. 
We also assembled data on the aggregate number of amendments for each of the 50 state 
constitutions, since adoption.  Table 2 presents summary statistics of these variables. 
[insert table 2] 
Many of the variables are the same as those in the panel data, but there are some 
differences.  PASSED is the total number of amendments to a constitution since its inception.  
RATE is the number of amendments per annum.  HOUSENOW is the number of members of the 
lower house in each state, while HOUSEADOPT is the number of members when the 
constitution was adopted.  Similarly, VAGEPOP is the voting age population of the state, while 
POPADOPT is the voting age population of the state at the time the constitution was adopted.  
Finally, CONBUCK is a measure of the difficulty of constitutional amendment, with 1 
representing the lowest level of difficulty, and 20 the highest.6 CONBUCK is an aggregate 
measure of the overall difficulty of constitutional amendment, and includes consideration of 
legislative voting rules, voting rules for popular ratification, and the presence and level of 
difficulty for the proposal of amendments by popular initiative.  It is constructed by ordering 
states lexicographically: first on the popular initiative rule (i.e. the percentage of voters required 
to initiate an amendment), second on the legislative rule, and finally on the popular rule.   
The fact that we are dealing, in this context, with count data—i.e. a situation in which the 
number of amendments over a particular time-frame is the dependent variable – means that 
careful treatment is required, in order to acknowledge that both negative outcomes are 
impossible (i.e. a state cannot have -7 amendments), and only integer outcomes are possible (i.e. 
a state can’t have 2.2 amendments in a year).   In this setting, Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
estimates are statistically inefficient; do not have consistent standard errors; and can produce the 
impossible prediction that a negative number of events (here, constitutional amendments) may 
have occurred.   We also found that for a poisson regression, there was a problem of over-
dispersion in our data. 7   We thus ran a fixed effects panel negative binomial regression, and 
used a random effects specification as a robustness check. 
Table 3 presents the results of this negative binomial regression for aggregate data on the 
rate of amendment in each state in our dataset, controlling for various measures of the difficulty 
of amendment and the number of members of the legislature.  Since this is, by necessity, so-
called “rate data” it also controls for the number of years each constitution has been in effect by 
including log (EXPOSURE) on the right-hand side.   
                                                      
6 This measure is similar to the measures used by Lutz 1995, Lijhpardt 1999 and Elster 2000, but different in some 
respects.  Lutz (1995) considers 70 possible different amendment requirements in three general categories: 
legislative majority, double passage requirements, and referendum requirements. He then assigns cardinal values to 
different requirements.  For example, he assumes that if an amendment must pass two houses of parliament this is 
twice as hard as if it had to pass only one house.  In contrast, we take an ordinal approach to remain agnostic about 
the exact degree of difficulty.  Lijhpardt (1999, p.219) focuses solely on the voting rule (simple majority, 50%-2/3, 
2/3 plus).  Elster (2000, p.101) focuses on four categories: legislative supermajority requirements, parliamentary 
quorum requirements, state ratification, and referendum requirements. Our measure ranks (from easiest to hardest) 
lexicographically popular initiative requirement, then legislative majority rule, then popular majority rule. 
7 The unconditional variance of many variables of interest is greater than the mean, as can be seen from the 
summary statistics table.  A poisson specification imposes a parametric assumption which assumes that mean to be 
equal to the variance, which may lead to misleading results (Hausman, Hall and Griliches, 1984). 
[insert table 3] 
Consistent with our first hypothesis, though the relationship was not particularly 
statistically significant (it had a p-value of 0.166), we found that an increase in the number of 
members in the house lead to fewer amendments, or for a one standard deviation change in the 
number of house members (compared to an overall average rate of amendment of 1.37 per 
annum), approximately 0.143 fewer amendments per annum.  Conversely, contrary to our second 
hypothesis, we found that states with a larger population tended to have more amendments.     
The other variables we found to be statistically significant were LENGTH; LIMIT; VAP; 
and LEGBUCK_2.   As authors such as Lutz (1995) and Ferejohn (1997) have previously found, 
longer constitutions were amended with greater frequency (Lutz 1995, p. 249; Ferejohn 1997, p. 
524). Formal limits on the number of amendments permissible in a given year, and a two-thirds 
supermajority requirement for legislative passage of a constitutional amendment, also led to 
there being fewer amendments.    
However, while these aggregate results are informative, they do not use the full amount 
of variation available in the data, and therefore we also ran panel data count regressions, in order 
to obtain more efficient estimates.    Table 4 reports the results of a negative binomial regression 
using the full panel structure of our data (i.e. year-by-year amendments rather than total 
amendments).   
[insert table 4] 
Most notably, it shows that the size of the lower house of the state legislature – i.e. 
number of house members – is negative and statistically significant at the one per cent level, and 
therefore provides strong confirmation of our first hypothesis.  The magnitude of this effect is 
also quite significant.   For example, a one standard deviation in the number of house members is 
associated with 0.27 fewer amendments per annum – or 2.7 fewer per decade.  This represents a 
14.6% reduction in the number of amendments relative to the mean.   
Contrary to our findings for the aggregate amendment data, it also shows that in this 
setting there was no statistically significant relationship between VAP, or VAPSQUARED, and 
the rate of amendment, but that to the extent there was a relationship between the two, it was 
negative.   This confirms our second hypothesis.  
Also of note, from the perspective of the hypotheses set out in part I, is the finding that 
neither the presence of a double passage requirement nor single subject rule had a statistically 
significant effect on the overall rate of amendment.   This suggests that there is limited support 
for either hypothesis 3 or 4, and thus also for deliberation and bargaining costs, as distinct 
explanations for the general scale-effect we find. 
Other factors we did find to have a statistically significant effect were LEGBUCK2; 
LEGBUCK3; INTIATIVE2; EXPOSURE and LENGTH.  As Panel 1 shows, compared to a 50% 
majority voting in a state legislature, a 60% super-majority rule reduces number of amendments 
by 0.603 per annum (compared to a mean number across all states of 1.823 per annum); and a 
2/3 majority rule by 0.243 per annum. 8  These effects were also clearly statistically significant – 
at the at the 1 and 5% levels respectively.    EXPOSURE and LENGTH were also significant at 
the 1% level, indicating that, as Lutz (1995), Ferejohn (1997) and others have found in the 
context of aggregate data, both longer-lived and longer-in-length constitutions tend to be more 
prone to amendment (see Lutz 1995, p.253, Ferejohn 1997, p.524).9    
The effect of an initiative provision on the ultimate rate of constitutional amendment 
appears more complex.  Only in the case of a relatively demanding initiative requirement (i.e. 
INITIATIVE2) did we find that there was any positive and statistically significant effect on the 
overall rate of amendment.   For less demanding initiative rules (i.e. INITIATIVE1), the 
presence of an initiative rule in a constitution had not statistically significant effect on the overall 
rate of amendment, most likely because it was possible for proponents of constitutional change 
to propose an amendment, without first building a broad base of political support. 
As panel 2 shows, the random effects model also produced almost identical estimates for 
these findings, with no change in which variables are significant, and little change in magnitudes, 
under this model.   
As an additional robustness check, we also considered the possibility that our results 
could be affected by the presence of multiple amendments in a given state in a particular year, 
followed by few amendments in other years; 10 and therefore recoded our data to include a 
variable AMEND, the value of which is set at zero if no amendments are made in a particular 
year and one if the constitution is amended.   Since this produced a binary dependent variable, 
we then ran three different econometric specifications: a linear probability, a logit and a probit 
model.   Table 5 reports the results of these three regressions, with standard errors clustered by 
state. 
[insert table 5] 
Consistent with our results in tables 3 and 4, it shows that for three of these 
specifications, we found that the size of the legislature had a clear negative relationship with the 
overall amendment rate – and again that this result was statistically significant at the 1% level. 
As before, it also shows that variables such as DOUBLEPASS, SINGSUB, LIMIT and INIT1 
had no statistically significant effect.     
For a linear probability model, as panel 1 shows, the only major difference in our 
findings was that LEGBUCK2 and LEGBUCK3 were no longer statistically significant; and that 
the effect of INIT2 was both less statistically significant and reversed – none of which affected 
                                                      
8 Since LEGBUCK is a categorical variable, LEGBUCK1 (equal to 1 if and only if a state has a 50% legislative 
rule) is dropped from the regression for standard collinearity reasons.  It is immaterial which of the 4 variables is 
dropped, but dropping LEGBUCK1 makes the interpretation easier. 
9 For similar findings in a global context, see Elkins, Ginsburg, and Melton (2009).  
10 This could reflect a mechanical effect where a change to the constitution requires multiple textual changes, or 
bundling of disparate changes due to legislative bargaining or other factors.   
our core hypothesis or findings.11  For a logit model, as panel 2 reports, the only change in the 
results is that LEGBUCK4 becomes significant at the 10% level, with a positive coefficient 
indicating that a 75% legislative rule makes it harder to amend.   For a probit model, which panel 
3 reports: EXPOSURE, LENGTH and HOUSE were all significant at the 1% level.  The 
interpretation of the coefficient on HOUSE is that a one standard deviation change in the number 
of house members leads to a 7% decrease in the probability of amendment in a given year (at the 
mean). 
As a final check of robustness, we also considered the possibility of common shocks 
across states as an explanation for these findings, and thus re-ran our original year-by-year 
negative binomial regression for a number of time sub-samples of the data.12  One period in 
particular that we focused was the 1960’s, because this was a period in which there both a 
relatively large number of observations in our dataset, and large-scale parallel changes across 
different states in the functioning of many state and local governments, and also in the 
recognition of various civil rights claims at a state as well as national constitutional level (see 
e.g. Williams 1985, pp. 1210-1212).  Not surprisingly, given the smaller number of observations 
in this sub-sample than our overall dataset, we found that our result was somewhat weaker in this 
context.  However, we found that it was nonetheless still present and statistically significant at 
the 9 percent level. 
Overall, we therefore find quite clear support, at a state constitutional level in the U.S., 
for the existence of a scale-difficulty tradeoff in the process of constitutional amendment.   
III. SCALE, AMENDMENT RULES & CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN  
For constitutional designers, this finding also suggests that there is a clear potential for a  
denominator problem to arise in the operation of constitutional amendment rules. 
 It is certainly possible that, in some contexts, a progressive increase in the difficulty of 
constitutional amendment could be beneficial.  However, in most cases, the weight of opinion on 
constitutional amendment favors the idea that the difficulty of amendment should at least remain 
stable, if not actually decrease over time (for discussion of this more Jeffersonian view, see e.g. 
discussion in Holmes 1995, pp. 158-61).13 This will also be especially true, if as noted at the 
outset, there are legitimate reasons why the demand to use constitutional amendment procedures 
may increase with time. 
This part therefore considers three potential ways in which a constitutional designer 
might go about attempting to address this denominator problem: (i) sliding-scale constitutional 
                                                      
11 One explanation for this increased difficulty of amendment in INIT2 states may have something to do with 
informal attitudes towards the legitimacy of amendment in such states: compare Vermeule (2006); Sullivan 1995.  
12 Since there is no variation within decade (or overall) in certain variables such as the legislative amendment rule, 
length, and crucially, the number of house members, it was not statistically feasible to run our main specification 
including time dummies for each decade.   
13 Two reasons to avoid substantially decreasing the difficulty of amendment, over time, are the desire to protect 
successful constitutional experiments, and also the decision costs and uncertainty associated with whole-scale 
constitutional revision.  Compare Strauss 1996, p. 910.  
amendment rule; (ii) a low, as compared to high, constitutional super-majority rule; and (iii) 
constitutional convention mechanisms; and the potential strengths and weaknesses of each when 
it comes to concerns about political party dominance, minority rights protection and 
constitutional stability. 
A.  THREE POSSIBLE DESIGN SOLUTIONS 
1. SLIDING-SCALE VOTING RULES 
In the European Union, as the size and membership of the Union have changed over time, so too 
have both the actual and proposed requirements for “qualified majority” voting in the Council of 
the European Union.   In many instances, these changes have reflected a concern on the part of 
larger member states to prevent the progressive enlargement of the E.U. from unduly diluting 
their voting power (see e.g. Dinan at 253-54).14  However, in more recent years,  changes have 
also been proposed to these rules that would make the requirements for E.U voting less rather 
than more demanding, in the face of increases in the size of the relevant voting body (see Paris 
Treaty).    
It is also seems quite feasible to imagine that a similar model could be adopted at a 
national constitutional level, so as to create a sliding-scale constitutional amendment rule, 
whereby the level of majority support required for a particular amendment decreased as the size 
of a relevant voting body increased (or potentially also vice versa).   
Such a sliding-scale rule could, for example, be derived by combining two separate 
findings in our data:  one, relating to the relationship between changes in the scale of the 
legislature and the difficulty of amendment; and the other, the relationship between the formal 
difficulty of amendment and effective rate of amendment.   In our data, we find, for example, 
that in the first context a one standard deviation increase in the size of the lower house of a 
legislature leads to a decrease in the rate of constitutional amendment of approximately 2.7 
amendments per decade; and in the second context, that a one step increase in the formal 
amendment rule (i.e. the move from LEGBUCK1 to LEGBUCK2, or from 50% to 60%) is 
associated with an increase in the amendment rate of approximately 6 amendments per decade.  
If one combines these findings, and also assumes linearity in respect of the effect of changes in 
the formal amendment rule, this would imply that the formal difficulty of amendment should 
decrease by 5% for every standard deviation increase in the size of a state legislature – at least up 
to a lower threshold of 50%.15    
 
                                                      
14 For example, in 2004, in the wake of 10 new members joining the Union, Art 205 of the Nice Treaty introduced 
new requirements for qualified majority voting requiring that proposed legislation obtain the support not only of 
50% of member states– or 72% of Council members – but also 62% of the total population of the EU, upon a request 
for such a count (Official Journal of the European Union (OJEU) 29.12.2006 C 321 E/136-137). Subsequent 
proposed reforms, such as those contained in the Treaty of Lisbon, have also attempted to add go further in this 
same direction, by imposing a super-majority requirement of 55% of member states and 65% of the total EU 
population (OJEU 17.12.2007 C 306). 
15 This result is, of course, potentially highly sensitive to the assumption of linearity. 
2. LOWER SUPER-MAJORITY RULES 
While they are far less common than super-majority voting requirements for constitutional 
amendment (see Elkins, Ginsburg and Melton 2009), simple majority rules apply in 15 states in 
the U.S. in the context of legislative amendments to the constitution; and also in many national 
constitutions, particularly those influenced by the UK’s non-codified constitutional model (see 
e.g. Young 2007).  In other countries, such as India, simple majority requirements also apply to 
the amendment of a particular sub-set of constitutional issues.16 
At an empirical level, we also found clear evidence to suggest that simple majority rules 
of this kind help counteract, at least to some degree, the effect of increases in scale in the 
legislature on the difficulty of constitutional amendment.17 
As table 6 shows, for example, when we re-examined the panel data reported in tables 4 
and 5 and included an interaction term between the number of house members and whether a 
state has a 50% legislative rule (interact HOUSE and LEGBUCK_1), we found both that the 
previously estimated variables were essentially unchanged and that there was a clear positive 
interaction effect, statistically significant at the 5% level, between these two variables. The 
implication of this finding is that, when there is an increase in the size of the legislature, the 
presence of a simple majority rule will tend, all else being equal, to lead to a clear increase in the 
number of successful constitutional amendments per year.18 
[insert table 6] 
At a theoretical level, one potential explanation for this, compared to more demanding 
super-majority voting rules, lower super-majority rules will tend to be more robust to changes in 
the size of the underlying voting population, particularly from the perspective of the statistical 
likelihood of there being independent support for a particular amendment.  As figure 2 
demonstrates, if votes are drawn entirely randomly and independently, as they are in a coin flip 
setting, the probability of successful amendment under an ordinary majority rule will (subject to 
integer rounding considerations) remain constant at 50%. 
                                                      
16 Constitution of India, Art 368.  
17 As a robustness check we estimate the samples separately (i.e. those states with a 50% rule, and the others), and 
find a significant difference between the coefficient of HOUSE in the two samples. 
18 As a robustness check we estimate the samples separately (i.e. those states with a 50% rule, and the others), and 
find a significant difference between the coefficient of HOUSE in the two samples. 
 
 
Figure 2 –Scale & probability of amendment given Simple Majority Rule 
 
 
 
3. CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS  
In the U.S, both Art V of the Constitution and most state constitutions explicitly provide for the 
possibility that constitutional amendments may be proposed by a constitutional convention, 
rather than the legislature.  Similar provisions also exist in the Swiss Constitution (see Tschaeni), 
as well, as more implicitly in the small ‘c’ constitutional framework of countries such as 
Australia (see Twomey).   
In most jurisdictions where actual conventions have been called, the practice has also 
been for conventions to be relatively small, at least compared to national or state legislatures. 
This, various scholars argue, both increases the likelihood of meaningful deliberation among 
members of a convention and reduces the costs of convening a convention, as a special 
legislative-like body (compare Saunders, Twomey etc).   
Provided, therefore, a constitutional designer can ensure that a constitutional convention 
is in fact called where there is a demand for constitutional change, a convention mechanism will 
offer another potential way in which to respond to the denominator problem identified in part II.  
There are also at least two ways in which a constitutional designer could overcome 
potential hurdles to a convention being called:  first, by creating of a lower threshold for the 
calling of a convention than for the legislative approval of actual constitutional amendments; and 
second, by making a popular vote on the calling of a convention mandatory, at fixed points in 
time.   Lower voting thresholds frequently apply in state constitutions in the U.S., and also 
countries such as Switzerland, for the proposal of constitutional amendments, as compared to the 
ratification or approval of amendments (see e.g. Swiss Federal Constitution 1999, Arts 138-42).  
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At a state level in the U.S., fourteen states also explicitly require a regular vote to be held on 
whether to call a constitutional convention (see e.g. Twomey).19 
B.  COMPARATIVE DANGERS (OR DISADVANTAGES) 
In assessing these three potential design solutions, it is, of course, important for a constitutional 
designer to consider a range of other constitutional structures and values – such as the structure 
of political parties (Isacharoff), the protection of minority rights (see e.g. Rawls 1993; Sager 
2001) and the importance of constitutional stability – and not simply the effect of a denominator 
problem.  
The strength and discipline of political parties, for example, will tend to have a major 
impact on the actual difficulty of constitutional amendment in almost all constitutional contexts.  
This impact may also be particularly pronounced for sliding-scale and simple majority voting 
rules.  (In the context of constitutional conventions, the influence of political parties will depend 
almost entirely on the mechanism adopted for the selection of convention delegates).  
Under such rules, the greater the dominance of a single party, for example, the greater the 
danger (at least, in the case of sliding-scale rules, over time) that amendments will be passed 
without adequate deliberation and support from a diverse range of perspectives (compare 
Issacharoff 2003).  By contrast, the stronger the degree of competition and discipline among two 
major parties, the more likely it is that political pressures will constrain the use of amendment 
procedures in a way that makes formally weak super-majority or even simple-majority voting 
requirements more than adequate to guard against the danger of overly flexible amendment. 
The protection of minorities, and particularly “discrete and insular” minorities in the 
political process (see Ely 1980), will be another important factor for constitutional designers to 
consider when adopting various amendment mechanisms. One potential advantage to a 
constitutional convention mechanism, from this perspective, will be that it allows seats to be 
reserved for particular minority groups (such as, in Australia, indigenous groups:  see Twomey).  
Sliding-scale and simple majority rules, on the other hand, may raise particular dangers.  If they 
adopt such rules, therefore, constitutional designers may also wish to consider applying them to 
only some, rather than all, forms of constitutional amendment – i.e. to only those amendments 
that do not touch on basic constitutional rights protections. Implicitly, this is the model adopted 
in the U.S. by state constitutions that have simple majority amendment requirements, given that 
such amendments are also subject to the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.20  
Several other countries have also adopted a similar approach by making certain fundamental 
rights guarantees either unamendable (see e.g. the German Basic Law of 1949; and as a matter of 
judicial interpretation) the Constitution of India 1950: see e.g. Diwan and Diwan 1997, Neuborne 
2003), or subject to higher majority voting requirements (see Constitution of South Africa 1996, 
s. 74(1)). 
                                                      
19 The relevant states are: Alaska (every 10 years), Connecticut (20 years), Hawaii (9 years), Illinois (20 years), Iowa 
(10 years), Maryland (20 years), Michigan (16 years), Missouri (20 years), Montana (20 years), New Hampshire (10 
years), New York (20 years), Ohio (20 years), Oklahoma (20 years), and Rhode Island (10 years).   
20 See e.g. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (invalidating a Colorado constitutional amendment adopted by 
popular initiative for inconsistency with the Equal Protection clause). 
The value of constitutional stability, and maintaining certain kinds of “internal” 
constitutional pre-commitment (see e.g. Ferejohn & Sager 2003), will be another factor for 
constitutional designers to consider.  One of the most serious objections against a constitutional 
convention mechanism, for example, is that can empower a small sub-group of voters or 
representatives to propose whole-scale revisions to a constitution, when the initial popular 
demand is for a much narrower form of constitutional updating or dialogue.   Whatever the 
formal legal limits on a particular convention (and there has been a major debate in the U.S. in 
particular on this question: see e.g. Dellinger), as a political matter, most commentators agree, it 
will be extremely difficult to restrain a “runaway convention” that exceeds the bounds of its 
mandate for constitutional change, and therefore, the calling of such a convention always 
represents some threat to constitutional stability. 
Compared to more demanding super-majority requirements, or even-sliding scale rules, 
simple majority voting rules can also pose a threat to constitutional stability.  For sliding-scale 
rules, there will be an initial period in which amendment is more difficult, and therefore, also 
less likely; and this, our findings in part II suggest, can have a significant impact on the 
subsequent likelihood of actual constitutional amendment. 21This is also another reason, beyond 
considerations of minority protection, why if she chooses such a simple majority rule, a 
constitutional designer might wish to limit its use to more minor amendments, as opposed to 
more large-scale forms of constitutional revision (compare e.g. Art XVIII of the California 
Constitution), or to certain subjects that do not touching on the “basic structure” of a 
constitution. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Political scientists and economists have long hypothesized that there is a connection between the 
size of a decision-making body and its output, in terms of constitutional amendment; and in this 
chapter, we show that, at a state constitutional level in the U.S., there is significant empirical 
support for this prediction. Our results show that for all states in the U.S. for which house size 
data is available, a larger house of representatives leads to a significantly lower probability of 
constitutional amendment: a one standard deviation in the number of house members in a 
particular state, we found, was associated with 2.7 fewer amendments per decade—or. a 14.6% 
reduction relative to the mean number of amendments.   These results were also robust to the 
inclusion of a number of controls, as well to various different count data specifications (i.e. 
Poisson and negative binomial). 
Our focus, in part III, is on exploring the possible normative implications of this for the 
design of constitutional amendment rules, and in particular, on the way in which three design 
mechanisms – namely, sliding-scale voting rules, simple majority voting rules and constitutional 
                                                      
21 In our data we found, for example, that if state amended its constitution in a given year, it was 2.8 times more 
likely than other states to amend it again 2 years later; and 1.9 times more likely to do so 4 years later.  There was 
also a strong degree of persistence for this effect, with the odds ratio of amendment still standing at 1.4 after 10 
years. These findings were also statistically significant at the 1% level.   See Table 7 in the appendix (reporting the 
results of a logistic regression of amendment on a series of lags of that variable).  
 
convention mechanisms – may be able to help address potential denominator problems in 
amendment procedures, over time.  
The empirical findings of the paper, however, also have potential relevance to a range of 
other constitutional debates, including debates about the optimal size of legislatures (see e.g 
Taapega & Shugart, 1989), and even, nations (see e.g. Alesina & Spolaore, 2003).   These are 
simply questions that, because of their complexity, are beyond the scope of this short chapter to 
address.  
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Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
vap 5285 2156768 5498174 10698.28 1.29E+08
amendts 4535 1.822933 6.148128 0 130
amend 4535 0.322161 0.4673558 0 1
legbcuk 5198 2.192959 0.8885848 1 4
init 5315 0.5629351 0.8033729 0 2
doublepass 5315 0.2957667 0.4564296 0 1
limit 5315 0.1047977 0.3063214 0 1
exposure 5315 66.8984 46.86321 1 226
house 5315 118.6591 73.25775 31 749
singsub 5315 0.2425212 0.4286481 0 1
length 5315 36117.12 47408.06 9200 340136
vapsquared 5285 3.49E+13 4.87E+14 1.14E+08 1.66E+16
TABLE 1: Panel Summary Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
proposed 49 215.4286 209.3933 8 1063
passed 50 139.62 140.8594 8 766
buck 50 13.52 5.003019 1 20
vagepop 50 3859319 3905686 360316 2.00E+07
rate 50 1.378804 1.277779 0.2465116 7.158878
popadopt 50 1039159 1879353 10698.28 7865581
housenow 50 110.24 55.58614 40 400
legbuck 49 2.204082 0.9124051 1 4
adopted 50 1899.32 52.96762 1780 1986
intitiative 50 0.56 0.8121526 0 2
doubpass 50 0.24 0.4314191 0 1
limit 50 0.1 0.3030458 0 1
singsub 50 0.26 0.4430875 0 1
length 50 35985.08 47816 9200 340136
TABLE 2: Aggregate Summary Statistics
Table 3: Amendment Rates Using Aggregate Data 
 
 
VARIABLES rate 
  
Vagepop 1.53e-07** 
 (7.70E-08) 
Housenow -0.00255 
 (0.00184) 
legbuck_1 -0.408 
 (0.292) 
legbuck_2 -0.549** 
 (0.222) 
legbuck_3 -0.215 
 (0.283) 
doubpass -0.597 
 (0.427) 
limit -1.039*** 
 (0.22) 
init_1 -0.043 
 (0.361) 
init_3 -0.206 
 (0.401) 
singsub 0.0016 
 (0.295) 
length 5.58e-06*** 
 (1.30E-06) 
vagepopsq 0 
 (0) 
Constant -4.157*** 
 (0.419) 
  
Observations 49 
VARIABLES amendts amendts
!!"1# !!!"2#
Fixed Effects Random Effects
doublepass 0.0974 0.0598
(0.107) (0.102)
limit -0.00878 -0.0614
(0.127) (0.120)
legbuck_2 -0.603*** -0.516***
(0.135) (0.130)
legbuck_3 -0.243** -0.218**
(0.105) (0.0998)
legbuck_4 0.275 0.338
(0.425) (0.381)
init_1 0.168 0.159
(0.132) (0.123)
init_2 -0.455*** -0.413***
(0.136) (0.130)
singsub 0.185 0.147
(0.118) (0.110)
house -0.00363*** -0.00377***
(0.000695) (0.000671)
exposure 0.00756*** 0.00708***
(0.000702) (0.000692)
length 1.45e-05*** 1.46e-05***
(2.00e-06) (1.93e-06)
vap -3.90e-09 2.08e-09
(9.59e-09) (9.36e-09)
vapsquared -0 -0
(0) (0)
Constant -2.179*** -2.152***
(0.153) (0.146)
Observations 4390 4390
Number of stateid 41 41
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 4: Panel Negative Binomial Results
VARIABLES amend amend amend
!!"1# !!!"2# !!!"$#
Linear Probability Logit Probit
vap 9.79e-09 -0.0155 -0.0168
(9.58e-09) (0.245) (0.150)
doublepass -0.00933 -0.255 -0.149
(0.0506) (0.218) (0.133)
limit -0.0519 0.00600*** 0.00361***
(0.0451) (0.00173) (0.00106)
exposure 0.00117*** -0.00506*** -0.00277***
(0.000376) (0.00156) (0.000845)
legbuck_2 -0.0605 -0.251 -0.161
(0.0575) (0.264) (0.162)
legbuck_3 -0.0147 -0.0427 -0.0325
(0.0422) (0.202) (0.123)
legbuck_4 0.0634 0.453* 0.251
(0.0546) (0.265) (0.159)
init_1 0.0323 0.138 0.0840
(0.0362) (0.186) (0.108)
init_2 -0.0637* -0.335** -0.195*
(0.0375) (0.170) (0.105)
singsub 0.0361 0.122 0.0810
(0.0316) (0.147) (0.0894)
length 3.78e-06*** 4.58e-08 1.08e-05***
(9.65e-07) (4.62e-08) (2.62e-06)
vapsquared -0 -0 2.82e-08
(0) (0) (2.63e-08)
house -0.000742*** 1.78e-05*** -0
(0.000253) (4.32e-06) (0)
Constant 0.200*** -1.228*** -0.777***
(0.0534) (0.268) (0.160)
Observations 4390 4390 4390
R-squared 0.064
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
TABLE 5: Estimates of Amendment Probability
VARIABLES amendts
doublepass 0.0464
(0.109)
limit -0.0611
(0.129)
legbuck_2 -0.0929
(0.259)
legbuck_3 0.269
(0.246)
legbuck_4 0.828*
(0.488)
init_1 0.106
(0.135)
init_2 -0.413***
(0.138)
singsub 0.170
(0.118)
house -0.00419***
(0.000744)
exposure 0.00799***
(0.000728)
length 1.38e-05***
(2.03e-06)
vap -1.31e-08
(1.05e-08)
vapsquared 0
(0)
houserule50interact 0.00542**
(0.00234)
Constant -2.560***
(0.226)
Observations 4390
Number of stateid 41
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
TABLE 6: House-Legislative Rule Interaction
VARIABLES amend
doublepass 1.145
(0.145)
limit 0.797
(0.116)
legbuck_1 2.217
(1.467)
legbuck_2 2.235
(1.468)
legbuck_3 2.077
(1.351)
house 0.998**
(0.000785)
init_1 1.083
(0.159)
init_2 0.871
(0.147)
singsub 1.026
(0.144)
length 1.000***
(3.13e-06)
vap 1.000
(5.86e-09)
amendlag1 0.954
(0.114)
amendlag2 2.837***
(0.291)
amendlag3 1.020
(0.125)
amendlag4 1.924***
(0.206)
amendlag5 0.890
(0.109)
amendlag6 1.553***
(0.168)
amendlag7 0.963
(0.120)
amendlag8 1.395***
(0.152)
amendlag9 0.808*
(0.0978)
amendlag10 1.400***
(0.157)
amendlag11 0.941
(0.114)
amendlag12 1.587***
(0.174)
amendlag13 0.959
(0.118)
amendlag14 1.121
(0.129)
amendlag15 1.048
(0.131)
amendlag16 1.126
(0.131)
amendlag17 0.787*
(0.0982)
amendlag18 1.305**
(0.145)
amendlag19 1.003
(0.122)
amendlag20 1.416***
(0.159)
Constant 0.0465***
(0.0316)
Observations 3479
Robust z-statistics in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 7: Amendment Lags
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